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This paper examines the information content of COPOM decisions to 
change or to leave unchanged monetary policy by estimating the responses 
of the term   structure to changes in the target for interest rates on COPOM 
meeting days. Within an event-study approach the evidence suggests that 
market participants anticipate, at least partially, monetary policy actions. 
Furthermore, it is found that the introduction of the floating exchange and 
inflation targeting regime has had a dampening effect on interest rate 
surprises along the term structure.  
 
Keywords: information content, announcements, interest rates, monetary 
policy. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper the influence of monetary policy on the term structure of interest rates is 
examined by estimating the effect of changes in the Brazilian Monetary Policy 
Committee’s (COPOM) short-term interest target rate.  
There is a voluminous empirical literature examining this issue for the Fed funds rate 
such as Balduzzi et alli (1997, 1998), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Cook and Hahn 
(1989), Reinhart and Simmin (1997) and Rolley and Sellon (1995, 1998a, 1998b). 
Furthermore, Buttiglione et alli (1996), Dale (1993), Haldane and Read (2000) and 
Hardy (1996) analyze the market reaction to changes in official interest rates for 
different countries such as the UK and Germany.  
We are not aware of previous studies that have focused on the effects of changes in 
COPOM’s target rate on the term structure of interest rates for the Brazilian market. 
Yet, the study of the response of market interest rates to changes in target official rates 
may give additional insights in the transmission channels of monetary policy, as it 
should be able to change the entire spectrum of short and long-term interest rates.  
Cook and Hahn (1989) were pioneers in this literature. They found evidence of strong 
response of short-term market interest rates and small response of long-term to changes 
in the Fed funds rate in the 1970s.  
Rolley and Sellon (1995) using a different sampling approach found evidence 
suggesting that long-term rates anticipate policy changes, well in advance of monetary 
policy actions, which could explain the results found in Cook and Hahn (1989).  
Rolley and Sellon (1998a) estimate statistically significant responses of long-term     
interest rates. Besides, Roley and Sellon (1998b) examine how Treasury security yields, 
stock prices, and federal funds futures rates respond on Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) meeting dates when expected policy actions do not occur. They 
found evidence supporting the existence of no announcement effects. 
Others studies have focused on the impact of monetary policy surprises on other 
markets. An interesting example is Thorbecke and Alami (1994) that found evidence of 
significant effects on stock prices for changes in the federal funds target changes.  5 
An interesting research paper is that of Haldane and Read (2000), which studies the 
response of the yield curve to monetary policy surprises for the United Kingdom, 
United States, Germany and Italy. They found evidence that the introduction of the 
inflation targeting regime has had a significantly dampening effect on yield curve 
surprises at the short end. 
This paper seeks to determine whether there are significant surprises in monetary policy 
by studying the relationship between changes in the official target rate and in market 
interest rates. Moreover, it tests whether the introduction of the floating exchange and 
inflation targeting regime has had any impact on these interest rate surprises along the 
term structure of Brazilian interest rates.  
The Brazilian economy has undergone significant changes in the 1990s. The first 
important structural break has been the Real stabilization plan that had success in 
defeating a two digit monthly inflation in Brazil in the mid 1990s. In early 1999 
monetary authorities has adopted an inflation targeting (IT) framework for monetary 
policy and has abandoned the fixed exchange rate policy. The main goal of this paper is 
to address the implications of this change in monetary policy on domestic interest rates 
surprises. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the adoption of the inflation targeting (IT) framework 
with a floating exchange rate has had a dampening effect on interest rate surprises along 
the term structure, which could be explained by a greater transparency of the conduct of 
monetary policy after the adoption of the IT.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the methodology that will be 
used in this paper.  Section 3 shows the empirical responses of the Brazilian term 
structure of interest rates to changes in the COPOM’s target rate while in Section 4 
evidence on response of the spreads of the term structure is presented. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
In this section we explore the methodology and the data employed in this study as well.  
We show explicitly how the term structure of interest rates was built from different 6 
financial instruments. Furthermore, we delineate the methodology that will be followed 
in the remainder of the paper.  
  
2.1.  The Data 
The main data of the paper consist of spot interest rates for maturities 1, 2 3, 6 and 12 
months.   
The Term structure is obtained through the interest rates embedded in the CDI over, the 
DI futures contracts (from the first to the third month contracts) and DI x Pre swap rates 
for 6, 12 and 24 months maturities. The spot rates are built by accumulating the implicit 
term rates between maturities of the instruments cited above, assuming that the term rate 
between maturities is constant
1.  
The DI x Pre swaps maturing on 6, 12 and 24 months’ time are contracts in which a part 
pays a fixed rate over an agreed principal, and receives a floating rate over the same 
principal, while the reverse occurs with his or her counterpart. There are no intermediate 
cash flows; the contracts are only settled on maturity.  
The floating rate in swap contracts is the overnight CDI rate, which tracks very closely 
the average rate in the market for overnight reserves at the central bank
2.   The parties 
trade a fixed interest rate that is used in our calculations. 
The implicit interest rate for maturity within T days is given 
by
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1 The main idea is that fixed income instruments have their nature changed on a day-by-day basis as each 
day they become securities with smaller term to maturity. However, with the definition of a limited 
number of terms, we have the so-called vertexes, which can be seen as virtual securities with the same 
maturity term. 
 
2 These contracts have been traded over-the-counter in Brazil since the early 90’s, and must be registered 
either on BM&F (a futures exchange) or on CETIP (a custodian).  7 
where 
R0 is the CDI over (one day overnight interest rate) 
R0,1 is the implicit term rate by the CDI over and the one-month DI future 
R1,2 is the implicit term rate by the one and two-months DI future 
R2,3 is the implicit term rate by the two and three-months DI future 
R3,4 is the implicit term rate by the three-months DI future and the 6-months SWAP DI 
x Pre 
R4,5 is the implicit term rate by the 6 and 12-months SWAP DI x Pre 
R5,6 is the implicit term rate by the 12 and 24-months SWAP DI x Pre 
T0 to T6 represent, in working days, the maturity of each financial instrument (T0 stands 
for the one-day CDI interest rate).  
 
2.2.  The Expectation Hypothesis 
The Expectation Hypothesis can explain the influence of changes in official interest rate 
target on market interest rates. According to the Expectation Hypothesis of the term 
structure the long rate on a bond is related to the short-term rate and expected future 
short rates. The relation between one and two-period rates is given by: 
() t t t t t r E r R ε + + = +1 2
1
      ( 1 )  
where Rt is the two-period rate and rt is the one-period rate, Et is the expectation 
operator conditional on available information at instant  t., and εt is a term premium. In 
general if we have a one-period rate and a long n-period rate then: 















       ( 2 )  
 8 
Thus the Expectation Hypothesis states that long-term rates are an average of current 
short-term rates and expected future short-term rates plus a risk premium term. 
Monetary policy affects long-term rates as it influences current and expected short-term 
rates. Additionally, the response of long-term rates in changes in COPOM’s target rate 
should depend on the expected persistence of changes in the target. 
The Expectation theory of the term structure in general is tested assuming additionally 
rational expectations. In that case 
1 1 1 + + + + = t t t t r r E η         ( 3 )  
where  1 + t η  is a mean zero, iid white noise error. 
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where we have used  t ε α− = a constant term premium. 
Equation (6) can be estimated and we should expect, if the Expectation Hypothesis 
holds, that the slope should be one. Furthermore, if there is a risk premium for being in 
longer term bonds then the intercept can be statistically significant, however it must be 
time-invariant. 
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The purpose of this paper is not to perform direct test of the Expectation Hypothesis but 
to test whether market interest rates for different maturities have significant responses to 
changes in the target rate
4.  Even if the Expectation Hypothesis holds it may be that 
long-term rates do not respond as agents recognize that monetary policy action is not 
likely to persist for prolonged periods of time in the same direction.  
 
2.3.  Testing for Interest Rates Surprises 
From the Expectation Hypothesis we have that long term interest rates can be seen as 
compounded short term expected interest rates. In general long term interest rates affect 
aggregate demand decisions. However, monetary authorities decide the target for short 
term interest rates and these decisions should affect long term interest rates by changing 
expectations for the path of future short term interest rates.  
The main goal of this paper is to test what are the effects of changes in the short term 
interest rates, specifically, study the effects of changing the target for the short term 
interest rate, which is used as an instrument to achieve price stability and lower inflation 
expectations. 
In this paper we follow along the line of Cook and Hahn (1989), which examined the 
one day response of bond rates to changes in the target fed funds rates using the 
following regression 
arg tt t RT e t αβ ε ∆=+ ∆ +        ( 6 )  
where ∆Rt stands for changes in market interest rates and ∆Targett for changes in the 
Fed funds target rate. The parameter β measures the mean interest rate surprise for any 
given maturity. If official target rate changes were fully anticipated then this coefficient 
should be equal to zero.  
                                                            
4 Tabak and Andrade (2001) have shown that the standard approach tend to lead to the acceptance of 
the EH plus Rational Expectation for the 2, 3 and 6 months interest rates but not for the 12 
month interest rates while using an “error-orthogonality” approach provided a decisive rejection 
of the EH plus Rational Expectations for all maturities. 10
In this paper we test whether the term structure of interest rates respond to changes in 
target rates, and to what extent. Furthermore, we test if the introduction of the inflation 
targeting regime has had any impact on the way interest rate surprises affect the term 
structure.  
Additionally, an interesting issue that is explored in this paper is whether changes in 
target rates have significant responses in the term structure spreads. We test  
() t Target ∆ + = − ∆β α t t r R        ( 7 )  
In the next sections we perform these tests and give some interpretations of the results 
that are found.  
 
3.  Measuring the response of the term structure to Monetary Policy 
We estimate the response of interest rates to changes in the official target rate with the 
regression 
t t i r ε β α+ ∆ + = ∆ t , Target        (8) 
where ri,t stands for the interest rate on maturity i at instant t.  
 
3.1  Active Monetary Policy 
The one-day response of interest rates to changes in the target is shown in table 1. The 
sample contains 31 changes in the target from June 26 1996 through February 14 2001. 
The meetings where the COPOM decided not to change the target were excluded from 
the analysis. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation as they 
were corrected using the Newey and West (1987) procedure
5.   
The α and β coefficients for all maturities up to 12 months are presented in the second 
and third columns of table1. The response of interest rates are not significant in all 
                                                            
5 This correction is necessary as the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics indicate that there may be 
autocorrelation in the residuals of these regressions. 11
cases, which can be easily seen by comparing estimated coefficients with their standard 
errors.  
 
Table 1: One-day response of interest rates to changes in the Target 
 
Maturity Intercept Response  R
2 SE DW 
 




23.20% 1.6518  2.2986 
      




11.87% 1.2368  2.2571 
      




5.55% 1.1724 2.3389 
      




0.09% 1.2392 2.3701 
      




1.22% 1.1670 2.3238 
      
Newey-West (1987) standard errors are given in parentheses 
The sample contains 31 changes in the target from June 26 1996 through February 14 2001. 
 
This result is in line with the findings of Cook and Hahn (1989) for the US bond 
market, which found evidence that for the 1980s market participants were able to 
anticipate monetary policy actions (contrasting with the 1970s where interest rate 
surprises where more pronounced). 
 
3.2.  Inaction and Action in Monetary Policy 
In this sub-section we test whether the results obtained previously remain unaltered by 
using a larger sample with 54 observations containing 31 changes and 23 no changes in 
the target from June 26 1996 through February 14 2001. 
Results are shown in table 2 and are similar as those found in table 1. The predictive 
power of the regressions increased slightly for the one-month response but decreased for 12
other maturities. Standard errors are huge if compared with estimated coefficients, 
which leads to the conclusion that both the intercept and slope are not statistically 
different from zero.  
 
Table 2: One-day response of interest rates to changes in the Target 
 
Maturity Intercept Response  R
2 SE DW 
 




25.25% 1.2488  2.1975 
      




9.51% 1.0437 2.6019 
      




3.56% 1.1011 2.6036 
      




0.06% 1.0693 2.6842 
      




0.85% 1.0456 2.6842 
      
* Significant at the 99% confidence level 
** Significant at the 95% confidence level 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors are given in parentheses 
The sample contains 54 months with changes and no changes in the target from June 26 1996 through 
February 14 2001. 
 
The results so far appear to indicate that monetary policy does not affect the term 
structure of interest rates in Brazil. This leads to the conclusion that COPOM actions 
have been fully anticipated which is a rather strong assertion.  
This could be further examined by an analysis of the relationship between changes in 
the term structure and futures changes in the target. The results found previously could 
be due to the fact that interest rates should respond to surprises in monetary policy but 
not to anticipated actions.  
Table 3 presents results for regressing the changes in the term structure to future 
changes in the target rate. As it can be seen, regressions for changes in market interest 
rates two days before COPOM’s meeting are not significant but if we test for an 13
anticipation of five days then for all maturities we have significant responses, which 
leads to the conclusion that COPOM’s decisions are indeed anticipated by market 
participants.  
However, the slope is significantly different from one that could mean that although 
changes in the target rate are being anticipated they may not being fully anticipated. 
Wald tests performed on these coefficients reject the null of a response equal to one for 
all maturities. 
 
Table 3: Movements in interest rates for different maturities  
before COPOM meetings 
 
  Two days before  Five days before   
Maturity Intercept  Response  Intercept  Response   









          









          









          









          









          
* Significant at the 99% confidence level 
** Significant at the 95% confidence level 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors are given in parentheses 
The sample contains 54 months with changes and no changes in the target from June 26 1996 through 
February 14 2001. 
 
3.3. The introduction of the Inflation Targeting Regime and Floating Exchange 
Regime 
A problem with the tests performed so far is that monetary policy has had a significant 
change in 1999, with the introduction of both a floating exchange (after many years 
with a crawling-peg exchange rate regime) and an inflation targeting regime.  14
We add a dummy variable for the change in the exchange rate regime that gives a zero 
value for the period before January 1999 and one thereafter.  The regression that we 
estimate is given by 
12 arg tt t t R T et Dummy r αβ β ε ∆=+∆ + ∆ +      ( 9 )  
In this case β2 measures the effect of the introduction of the floating exchange regime 
and the inflation targeting regime. In table 4a we show the results.  
 
Table 4a: One-day response of interest rates to changes in the Target 
 
Maturity Intercept  Response  IT  Response R
2 SE DW 
 






55.44 %  0.9550  1.7668 
          






40.37 %  0.8391  2.4030 
          






31.20 %  0.9211  2.4075 
          






29.13 %  0.8919  2.3794 









22.03 %  0.9185  2.4470 
          
* Significant at the 99% confidence level 
** Significant at the 95% confidence level 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors are given in parentheses 
The sample contains 54 months with changes and no changes in the target from June 26 1996 through 
February 14 2001. 
 
The results shown in table 4a are in line with the findings of Haldane and Read (2000). 
The introduction of the floating exchange rate and inflation target regime has had a 
dampening effect on interest rate surprises in Brazil, as the coefficient for the dummy 
variable is negative for all maturities. Yet, the explanatory power had a huge increase. 
   15
 
Table 4b. Wald Tests  (H0: β1 + β2 = 0) 
Maturity  χ
2-Statistic  p-value 
1 month  0.0039  0.9499 
2 months  24.18  0.0000 
3 months  47.07  0.0000 
6 months  54.09  0.0000 
12 months  41.57  0.0000 
 
We also performed Wald tests for the joint restriction on both coefficients β1 and β2=0, 
if there is a significant effect from the IT framework then the sum of these coefficients 
should be statistically distinguishable from zero. As we can see from table 4b this seems 
to be the case for all maturities except for the one-month interest rate
6. 
We can conclude that the regressions made before were misspecified. In average the 
interest rate surprise is significant for the whole sample. Additionally, the response of 
interest rates decreases as maturity lengthens, as one should expect. 
This dampening effect that was found in this paper could be due to two main reasons. 
The first one relates to the greater transparency that is associated to the IT framework. 
Another reason is that under a fixed exchange rate regime all decisions from COPOM's 
meeting should be reflected in interest rates as the impact on the exchange rate was 
blocked, while with a floating exchange rate regime the exchange rate can absorb part 
of surprises and thus the impact on interest rates could be reduced.  
 
4.  Measuring the response of the term structure spreads to Monetary Policy 
We also checked how the slope of the term structure responded to changes in the target. 
We estimated the following regression 
() ,t Target it t Rrαβ ∆− = + ∆        ( 1 0 )  
where R stands for long-run rates and r for short-term rates.  
                                                            
6 We have also used a dummy to capture the effects of meetings that have decided to change interest rates 
from meetings in which the target was not changed. These dummies were insignificant for all maturities 
and results remained qualitatively the same.  16
Table 5 shows the one-day responses of the slope of the yield curve responded to 
changes in the target, where 2m-1m is the spread between two and one-month rates, 
using only effective changes in the target.  
 
Table 5: One-day response of the term structure Spread to changes in the Target 
() t Target ∆ + = − ∆β α t t r R  
Spread Intercept  Response  R
2 SE DW 
 




32.63% 0.7460  2.0169 
      




35.93% 0.9200  2.0634 
      




41.75% 1.1050  1.9680 
      




43.43% 1.2590  1.8114 
      
      
* Significant at the 99% confidence level 
** Significant at the 95% confidence level 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors are given in parentheses 
The sample contains 31 changes in the target from June 26 1996 through February 14 2001. 
 
Both the response of the spread and the explanatory power increase as maturity 
lengthens. The expected signs of coefficients are correct and interpretation could be that 
changes in the target rate may not imply in further changes in the future, in which case 
long-term rates would rise as well.  
In table 6 we show evidence using the entire sample, including no changes in the target. 
A fact that’s worth mentioning is that although explanatory power has decreased a little, 
response to target rate changes are almost the same for all cases
7. 
                                                            
7 We have also used a dummy for the IT period and it was not significant for all maturities. In this case 
the target has affect only the spread between the 12 and 6 months and the one month interest rate. 
However, Wald tests for the restriction that the sum of the coefficients on the target and the dummy is 
equal to zero have been rejected for all cases. 17
 
Table 6. One-day response of the term  structure spread to changes in the target.  
() t Target ∆ + = − ∆β α t t r R  
 
Spread Intercept  Response  R2  SE  DW 
 
      




23.50% 0.6991  2.1055 
      




23.73% 0.9217  1.9150 
      




34.89% 0.9536  1.9211 
      




36.61% 1.0832  1.8977 
      
      
* Significant at the 99% confidence level 
** Significant at the 95% confidence level 
*** Significant at the 90% confidence level 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors are given in parentheses 
The sample contains 54 months with changes and no changes in the target from June 26 1996 through 
February 14 2001. 
 
A final test is made using five-day response to changes in the target. Results show that 
the response is higher which is consistent with results found in the previous section. 
There is some degree of anticipation of monetary policy actions by market participants. 
 
 18
Table 7 Five-days response of the term  structure Spread to changes in the Target.  
() t Target ∆ + = − ∆β α t t r R  
 
Spread Intercept  Response  R2  SE  DW 
 
      




35.13% 0.6763  1.7929 
      




25.66% 1.3178  1.5017 
      




27.02% 2.0248  1.6079 
      




28.91% 2.1678  1.6482 
      
      
* Significant at the 99% confidence level 
** Significant at the 95% confidence level 
*** Significant at the 90% confidence level 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors are given in parentheses 
The sample contains 54 months with changes and no changes in the target from June 26 1996 through 
February 14 2001. 
 
Evidence so far shows that changes in the target rate may be predicted and are 
incorporated in market interest rates before COPOM’s meetings.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
The results found in this paper appear to indicate that the term  structure  do not respond 
to monetary policy actions, measured by changes in official target rate changes. These 
results are robust using two distinct samples, one which includes only effective changes 
and another which includes also no changes in the target rate.  
However, assuming that the target rate should indeed influence interest rate for different 
maturities we performed tests checking if expected target changes would influence 
interest rates. Results were conclusive for different sampling approaches. There is some 
degree of anticipation in monetary policy action by market participants.  19
Two types of additional tests were done. In the first place, we tested if spreads of the 
interest rates responded to changes in the target rate and found that they do, although 
not on a one-to-one basis. 
Some extensions are suggested for further research. The first would be to perform these 
tests with a higher frequency and check whether the term structure respond differently 
in different positions in the Business Cycle. Another extension would be to use interest 
rates futures contracts to extract market expectations on target rate changes and perform 
the regressions using anticipated and no anticipated monetary policy actions.  
Finally, an alternative methodology could be to decompose official rates changes into 
their anticipated and no anticipated components, and then estimating the response of the 
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